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Holding Virtual Child Pornography Creators Liable By 
Judicial Redress: An Alternative Approach to 
Overcoming the Obstacles Presented in Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition 
 
Daniel W. Bower 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Perhaps no subject magnifies the current tension between social 
science and legal scholarship more than virtual child pornography.1 
Legal historians acknowledge that while social science research received 
little acknowledgement or deference in the development of American 
jurisprudence, social science has steadily become an increasingly 
important influence on contemporary law.2 Despite these advances, the 
one topical area that has been particularly slow and historically unwilling 
to accept social scientific methods and theoretical structures has been 
free speech law.3
For many behavioral scientists, the virtual child pornography case 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition is another illustration of legal 
scholarship’s unwillingness to give social scientific evidence sufficient 
consideration when attempting to explain human behavior.4 However, 
these social scientists should not be completely discouraged by the 
Supreme Court’s analysis. Notwithstanding the Court’s collective belief 
that virtual child pornography does not cause general harm to children, 
the Court has left open a prime opportunity for social science to support 
its contrary conclusions, though in a more limited context. 
This Comment will describe that possibility and articulate how a 
state-created civil cause of action for child victims harmed by virtual 
child pornography satisfies the underlying free speech concerns and legal 
formalism obstacles articulated by the Court in Ashcroft, while 
 1. For various perspectives regarding the interplay between communication effects and the 
law, see JEREMY COHEN AND TIMOTHY GLEASON, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN COMMUNICATION AND 
LAW (1990); PAUL L. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972); Clay Calvert, 
Hate Speech and Its Harms: A Communication Theory Perspective, 47 J. COMM. 4 n.1 (1997). 
 2. JEREMY COHEN AND TIMOTHY GLEASON, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN COMMUNICATION AND 
LAW 43-45 (1990). 
 3. See generally Mathew Bunker & David Perry, Standing at the Crossroads: Social 
Science, Human Agency and Free Speech Law, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1 (2004) [hereinafter 
Crossroads]; MATHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND 
THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY (2001). 
 4. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
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simultaneously providing social science the opportunity to validate its 
findings in individual cases. 
This Comment is divided into five parts. Following this introduction, 
the subsequent section will describe the legal framework of free speech 
jurisprudence, including a background on child pornography and virtual 
child pornography law. Part III will provide a theoretical and historical 
basis for understanding the role of social science research in current free 
speech law and describe that background in light of the Supreme Court’s 
most recent child pornography and virtual child pornography cases. Part 
IV will provide an alternative means for addressing harm caused by 
virtual child pornography and address similar attempts in the areas of 
violence and discrimination. Part V will discuss the strengths of that 
alternative and specifically describe how this approach addresses the 
obstacles presented in Ashcroft. Finally, this Comment will close with a 
brief summary and conclusion articulating why there is a general need 
for providing judicial redress. 
 
II.  FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE 
 
It is often asserted that the language of the First Amendment is 
“exceptionally crisp and unambiguous.”5 Absent from the clause are the 
seemingly typical constitutional and historically malleable terms 
necessary,6 unreasonable,7 excessive,8 unusual,9 and due.10 The First 
Amendment reads simply that Congress shall make no law “abridging 
the freedom of speech.”11 Notwithstanding this textual clarity, arguably 
no other constitutionally protected right has prompted such pervasive and 
well-known commentary and debate.12
Despite the simplicity of a literal interpretation of the First 
Amendment, courts have been unwilling to adopt such a blanket 
standard.13 Rather, courts have created categorical exceptions to core free 
 5. William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 
107, 110 (1982) (asserting that “most of the principal affirmative restrictions on government power 
are far more ambiguous or equivocal”). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 8. 
 7. Id. IV. 
 8. Id. VIII. 
 9. Id. VIII. 
 10. Id. V.; XIV. 
 11. Id. I. 
 12. Thomas C. Kates, Note, Publisher Liability for “Gun for Hire” Advertisements: 
Responsible Exercise of Free Speech or Self Censorship?, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1203, 1204 (1989). 
 13. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483, 485 (1957) overruled by Memoirs v. 
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (“In light of this history, it is apparent that the unconditional 
phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance. . . . We hold that 
obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”); Van Alstyne, supra 
    




A.  Categorical Free Speech Analysis 
 
The categorical analysis begins with a threshold determination of 
whether the government is restricting speech based on its communicative 
impact.14 If the regulation is based on the communicative impact, the 
court then determines whether the kind of speech at issue fits into a 
previously identified category or exception,15 for example, speech that is 
considered obscene, or that advocates imminent lawless action.16 
Pursuant to that determination, the speech restriction will be evaluated 
under varying levels of scrutiny.17 If the speech falls within one of these 
note 5, at 111-12. Van Alstyne asserts that the literal interpretism perspective failed because of 
numerous “irresistible counter examples”: 
Possibly the best known counterexample is a variation of an instance used by Mr. Justice 
Holmes: a person knowingly and falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater for the 
perverse joy of anticipating the spectacle of others being trampled to death as the panicked 
crowd surges toward the theater exit. The counterexample could be: the mere oral statement 
of one person to another, offering to pay $5,000 for the murder of the offeror’s spouse; a 
Congressman’s bribe solicitation; an interstate manufacturer’s deliberately false and 
misleading commercial advertisements; a witness committing perjury in the course of a trial; 
or a member of the public interrupting (by speaking) someone else already speaking at a city 
council meeting. The counterexample need not be more complicated than a simple, soft 
statement made to the president that he will be shot if he fails to veto a particular bill or grant 
a certain pardon. 
Id. at 113-14 (internal citations omitted). 
 14. “[C]ommunication has its central interest in those behavioral situations in which a source 
transmits a message to a receiver(s) with conscious intent to affect the latter’s behavior.” GERALD R. 
MILLER, EXPLORATIONS IN INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION 92 (1976). Communicative impact is 
the degree to which this interest is accomplished. 
 15. If a kind of speech does not fit into a categorical exception it is often referred to as core 
speech. Core speech typically receives the most stringent First Amendment protection. Typically this 
class of speech includes political, religious, aesthetic, scientific, or philosophical speech. Van 
Alstyne, supra note 5, at 140; see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
(identifying allegedly defamatory statements criticizing public officials as protected core political 
speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (addressing the wearing 
of a black armband by a student to protest the Vietnam War as protected core speech). 
 16. EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 
2 (2001). 
 17. As a result, First Amendment scholars note that a principal task of the courts has been to 
make categorical determinations which ultimately lead to the court balancing the “kinds and degrees 
of evil” against the “improbability of their occurrence” to determine which kinds of abridgments 
should receive exception status. See Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 139-40. Van Alstyne uses the 
language of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), to support the following conclusion: 
[T]he principal task of the courts as graduating the kinds and degrees of evil to be 
balanced against the improbability of their occurrence resulting from particular speech to 
determine whether the degree of abridgment was unavoidable and therefore permissible. 
Correspondingly, an increasingly fashionable view holds that it is important to graduate 
the kind of speech to be invaded. 
See also Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 139-40 (describing the contending schools [of thought] the 
past several decades as “introducing finer gradations of a particular sort [that] may appear both more 
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categories the restriction may be given little if any protection.18 If the 
restricted speech falls outside of one of the exceptions19 or if the court 
refuses to create a new exception, the restriction may still be 
constitutional so long as the restriction passes strict scrutiny.20 The 
following subsection will identify those free speech exceptions relevant 
to the area of virtual child pornography. 
 
B.  Child Pornography 
 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that child 
pornography does not receive First Amendment protection and is, 
therefore, a categorical exception.21 Under the current legal regime, both 
federal and state statutes outlaw the creation, sale, and possession of 
child pornography.22 Because the Court has determined that child 
pornography is an exception that receives no free speech protection, 
controversy has primarily centered on what constitutes child 
pornography.23 Child pornography is generally defined as sexually 
explicit material that features children under the age of seventeen.24 The 
federal statute provides in whole that: 
 
“Child pornography” means any visual depiction, including any 
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated 
image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, 
moderate and less rigid in the measuring of protected speech”). 
 18. VOLOKH, supra note 16, at 273-74. 
 19. Moreover, if the speech is commercial advertising it receives less protection. Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Speech is considered 
commercial if it proposes a commercial transaction. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 66 
(1983). Once a court determines that speech is commercial the court must make a threshold 
determination of whether the speech is false or misleading. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) 
(providing that false and misleading advertising may be restricted by the government); see also 
Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof. Reg., 512 U.S. 136 (1994). If the speech is commercial 
advertising but neither false nor misleading, the court applies a form of intermediate scrutiny 
sometimes referred to as the Central Hudson test. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 
(1996). Under this test the speech may only be restricted if the restriction is justified by a substantial 
government interest that is directly advanced by the restriction and if the restriction is not anymore 
extensive than is necessary to advance that interest. 
 20. VOLOKH, supra note 16, at 2 (In order to pass strict scrutiny a restriction must establish 
that there is a compelling state interest and that the regulation substantially advances that interest, is 
not over inclusive, and does not burden a substantial amount of expressive conduct that does not 
implicate the interest.); see also Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 140 (identifying the hierarchy of 
protected speech). 
 21. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982). 
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 2251-2253 (2000). 
 23. Similarly, the debate with obscenity typically centers on what is and is not obscene. See 
generally Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
 24. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (Supp. 1999). 
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or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where - (A) the production 
of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct; (B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, 
of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; (C) such visual 
depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an 
identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (D) such 
visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or 
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the 
material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.25
 
Although child pornography can be prohibited if it is considered 
obscene, it need not be obscene to be illegal.26 Because of child 
pornography’s unique effects on children, it is relegated under a different 
standard and analysis than general obscenity.27 The Court first identified 
this separate standard in New York v. Ferber.28
In Ferber, the Court decided that child pornography should be an 
independent exception to free speech protection.29 The Court reasoned 
that an exception was necessary given the state’s previously recognized 
compelling interest to safeguard the physical and psychological well-
being of children.30 The Court supported this reasoning by finding that: 
(1) the production and dissemination of child pornography are related to 
the sexual abuse of children, (2) the underlying activity (sexual 
molestation and exploitation) is illegal, and (3) the societal and artistic 
value of child pornography is “de minimus.”31 Based on these findings 
and an identifiable compelling state interest, the Court concluded that the 
creation, distribution, and possession of child pornography could be 
banned regardless of free speech protection.32
 25. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) (Supp. 1999) (providing that “‘sexually explicit 
conduct’ means actual or simulated sexual intercourse . . . bestiality; masturbation; sadistic or 
masochistic abuse; or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area”). In New York v. Ferber, 
458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982), the Court upheld a statutory definition of child pornography as images 
that “visually depict” minors “performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals.” 
 26. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761. 
 27. If child pornography is obscene it can be prohibited under the Miller Standard. United 
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994). 
 28. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 756-62. The court cited Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944), and 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982), for the proposition that 
“democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young 
people into full maturity as citizens” and that “safeguarding the physical and psychological well-
being of a minor is compelling.” 
 31. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-66. 
 32. Id. The Court rejected the argument that the states’ interests could be adequately 
addressed through the obscenity standard. 
 240 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 19 
 
Eight years later, in Osborne v. Ohio, the Court made some 
additional observations that modified the Ferber rationale.33 To begin 
with, Osborne identified a reasonable mistake of fact defense to the 
charges of possession or distribution that arguably limited prosecutorial 
power.34 However, Osborne also noted harm to children in general as an 
additional state interest for precluding child pornography.35 The Court 
specifically noted that “pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other 
children into sexual activity.”36 Some scholars identified this additional 
state concern as potential support for a broader reading of Ferber.37 They 
were wrong. 
 
C.  Virtual Child Pornography 
 
The technological imaging and computer science advances since 
Ferber and Osborne have made it increasingly possible to create life-like 
digital images of children performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting 
their bodies. These new computer generated simulacra are typically 
referred to as “virtual child pornography.”38 In 2002, the Court, 
recognizing a need for clarification, took the opportunity to determine 
the constitutionality of statutes banning these computer generated 
images.39
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,40 the Court addressed the 
constitutionality of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 
(CPPA), a statute that prohibited possession or distribution of child 
pornography.41 The act defined child pornography as any visual 
depiction that “is, or appears to be of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct” and, therefore, precluded the possession and 
distribution of virtual or computer-generated child pornography.42 The 
statute relied on principles set out in Ferber, which, as noted above, 
banned child pornography because of the government’s interest in 
protecting children.43
The government asserted that the CPPA’s purpose, pursuant to 
 33. 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. E.g.VOLOKH, supra note 16, at 168-69. 
 38. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 234, 235 (2002). 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (1996). 
 42. Id. at §§ 2252A(a)(6), 2256(8)(B) (Supp. V 1999). 
 43. Id. 
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Congressional findings, was to protect children by banning materials that 
threaten children.44 Relying on social scientific research, Congress found 
that pedophiles often use the materials to encourage children to 
participate in sexual activity.45 Moreover, Congress cited a number of 
studies that concluded that virtual child pornography, like actual 
pornography, would lead to an expansion in the creation and distribution 
of child pornography in general, resulting in an increase in the “sexual 
abuse and exploitation of actual children.”46 Finally, Congress pointed to 
a number of scientific findings that virtual child pornography would 
essentially whet the “sexual appetites” of potential pedophiles 
encouraging them to act on their perverted desires.47
The Court rejected these arguments and congressional findings 
supported by social and behavioral science research. The Court 
determined that virtual child pornography could not be included in the 
categorical exception of child pornography created by Ferber.48
The rest of this Comment will detail the Court’s legal analysis and 
suggest an alternative means of addressing harm caused by virtual 
pornography. This Comment will also suggest what opportunities have 
been left open for social science, despite being essentially ignored and 
even rejected. However, in order to properly understand the Court’s 
reasoning, the following section will provide a brief historical and 
theoretical background explaining why the judiciary has been reluctant to 
consider interdisciplinary research and theoretical models approaches 
when dealing with free speech issues. 
 
III.  THEORETICAL HISTORY AND APPLICATION 
 
A.  Historical Tension 
 
Arguably no area of the law fosters the tension between behavioral 
science and traditional legal thought more than free speech.49 Many 
interdisciplinary scholars have criticized American legal jurisprudence 
because historically, it has been slow to accept and incorporate social 
 44. Id. 
 45. Congressional Findings, note 3, following § 2251; see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 
103, 112 (1990). 
 46. Congressional Findings, notes 4, 10(B), following § 2251. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 257-59 (2002). 
 49. For various perspectives regarding the interplay between communication effects and the 
law, see JEREMY COHEN & TIMOTHY GLEASON, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN COMMUNICATION AND LAW 
(1990); PAUL L. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972); Calvert, supra note 1, 
at 4. 
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scientific methods and theoretical structures.50 These scholars primarily 
point to the rise of legal formalism as the most significant obstacle to 
non-legal scholarship contribution. Specifically problematic for the non-
legal researcher was the Langdellian concept of formalism51 that 
premised the belief that the law independently generates “definitive and 
wise legal rules” that “could be applied deductively to all later cases, 
without the need for the contributions of other disciplines.”52
Although legal formalism has been challenged by legal realists,53 
legal criticalists,54 and general postmodern legal movements,55 and 
displaced in large part by recent courts’ willingness to accept and import 
methods and theories from other disciplines,56 First Amendment 
jurisprudence has been remarkably true to the original concept of 
Langdellian formalism by refusing to consider alternative social 
scientific research.57
One explanation for First Amendment jurisprudence’s unique ability 
to withstand outer-disciplinary influence may be the philosophical 
underpinnings of the principle behind free speech. Some have referred to 
this philosophical perspective as the “autonomy” or independent theory 
of free speech.58 This theory emphasizes that government should always 
treat people as if they were both rational and autonomous by allowing 
them unfettered access to information.59 The concept of restricting 
information and, therefore choice, seems counterintuitive to Western 
systems of government. 
The independent theory of free speech presupposes an empowered 
individual, a person that cannot be compelled to act pursuant to receiving 
 50. See Bunker & Perry, supra note 3, at 1-3 (2004); see generally BUNKER, supra note 2. 
 51. Formalism as articulated by Harvard Law School Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell. 
See Bunker & Perry, supra note 3, at 2 (2004) (citing CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, LAW OF 
CONTRACTS vi (1871)). 
 52. Bunker & Perry, supra note 3, at 2 (2004) (citing LANGDELL, supra note 51, at vi). 
 53. For a discussion on legal realism and its effect on traditional legal formalism, see Roscoe 
Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 489 n.6 (1912); 
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The 
Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 187 (1920). 
 54. See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 
606 (1993); BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 159-80 (1996). 
 55. See generally GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND 
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END (1995). 
 56. See Bunker & Perry, supra note 3, at 1-2 (2004) (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN 
CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 606 (1993) (“The dependence of law on politics is 
masked by a formal apparatus designed to create the impression that law is autonomous and 
neutral.”)). 
 57. See generally Richard Delgado, First Amendment Formalism is Giving Way to First 
Amendment Legal Realism, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1969 (1994). 
 58. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 150 (1989). 
59.   Id. 
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a particular message. Nevertheless, it is also a belief currently under 
attack in sociological, psychological, and communication effects 
research.60 Communications researchers have noted that the current trend 
of modern psychology and behavior science is a “drive toward 
determinism in which the appearance of agency [is] removed from 
explanations that instead depended upon transcendental social and 
material forces.”61
Therefore, while courts typically deem legal formalism inadequate 
when considering economic, political or tort related action, courts are 
particularly hesitant to consider social science when it suggests that 
media messages control or influence human behavior. The Supreme 
Court’s discussion and analysis in Ashcroft illustrates this tension. 
 
B.  Formalistic Analysis 
 
As previously noted, in Ashcroft the Supreme Court declined to 
include virtual child pornography in the categorical exception of child 
pornography created by Ferber.62 Although the Court struck down the 
CPPA statute for two reasons—breadth and absence of compelling state 
interest—only the latter finding was relevant to the Court’s 
determination to not include virtual child pornography as one of the 
categorical exceptions from free speech protection.63
The Court based its analysis of harm and possible government 
preclusion of speech on two primary assumptions, both deeply rooted in 
the mode of legal formalism. First, the Court found that the specific harm 
at issue in Ashcroft was different than Ferber.64 Second, and more 
relevant to the discussion of causation, the Court reasoned that in 
addition to being specifically distinguishable, the kind of harm was not 
sufficiently related or identifiable to fall under the same general state 
 60. As noted by Bunker and Perry, despite the historical perspective, current social science 
has focused on more deterministic models that essentially assert that individuals are not completely 
autonomistic but influenced heavily by the messages and information surrounding them. Crossroads, 
supra note 3, at 4 (citing John Lawrence Hill, Law and the Concept of the Core Self: Toward a 
Reconciliation of Naturalism and Humanism, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 289 (1997)). 
Inherent in the argument is the concept of agency. On one hand there is the perspective that 
asserts that environment, whether genetic or physiological accounts for all human behavior. The 
other perspective is that whatever the environment or physiological influence the individual always 
has the ability to choose to do something different. Despite this spectrum and diametric perception, 
most lay persons feel that the truth lies somewhere between. See Crossroads, supra note 3, at 13-15 
(2004). 
 61. See Crossroads, supra note 3, at 13-15 (2004). 
 62. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773-74 (1982). 
 63. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 250-54 (2002). 
 64. Id. at 250. 
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interest that justified state preclusion.65
 
1.  Distinguishable specific harm 
 
First, the Court concluded that “these images [virtual child 
pornography] do not involve, let alone harm, any children in the 
production process.”66 On the basis of this conclusion, the Court 
distinguished and limited Ferber to only those images that actually use a 
child in their creation.67 Since virtual pornography doesn’t require an 
actual child to create the image, Ferber is, in a general sense and 
according to legal formalism, inapplicable because it involves a different 
kind of harm. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Court still had to 
address the argument that although the specific harm was technically 
different, both cause harm to children and, therefore, both are included in 
the more general interest of the state to protect a vulnerable group of 
individuals.68
 
2.  The general state interest in protecting child victims 
 
Having distinguished Ferber in terms of the specific harm that 
results from using a child to produce child pornography, the Court still 
needed to explain why the state’s interest in protecting children was not 
sufficient in this case as it was in Ferber.  The Court began its analysis 
with an unprecedented focus on causation rather than relying on pure 
legal formalism tactics. By doing so, the Court suggested a willingness to 
consider social scientific and behavioral research. 
The Court emphasized that in Ferber the materials were “a 
proximate link to the crime from which it came.”69 With regard to the 
materials at issue in Ashcroft, the Court concluded that “virtual child 
pornography is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children, 
as were the materials in Ferber.”70 The Court provided that: “[w]hile the 
Government asserts that the images can lead to actual instances of child 
abuse, the causal link is contingent and indirect. The harm does not 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 241. The Court apparently failed to consider “morphed” child pornography a 
subcategory of virtual pornography that begins with a real base image – and, therefore, actually 
includes, and thus harms, an actual child in its production. 
 67. Id. at 250, 254-55. 
 68. Id. at 250. Indeed, the Court cites Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (identifying 
the “importance of the State’s interest in protecting the victims of child pornography” and 
identifying the State’s interest in preventing child pornography from being used as an aid in the 
“solicitation of minors”). 
 69. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762. 
 70. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250. 
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necessarily follow from the speech, but depends upon some unquantified 
potential for subsequent criminal acts.”71
Despite these scientific conclusions, the Court never cited any social 
scientific research or independent study in support of its assertions.72 It 
simply found a priori that the causal link between virtual child 
pornography and child harm is non-existent or too attenuated.73 To make 
its point, the Court abandoned the legal realist (or interdisciplinary) 
approach altogether and retreated into an area of traditional comfort – 
legal formalism. It concluded that legal precedent and constitutional 
construction as a technical matter cannot support the government’s 
position.74
A review of the Court’s analysis in Ashcroft delineates the obstacles 
that must be overcome if virtual child pornography is to be regulated. 
First, it is clear that any statute banning or creating a cause of action that 
essentially regulates this area must withstand the challenges of legal 
formalism. Second, while the Court acknowledged causation and, 
therefore, also acknowledged a role for behavioral scientists, it is clear 
that the Court views this concession as an additional obstacle. Therefore, 
in addition to having to overcome the rigors of legal formalism, the 
proponent of the regulation must also establish an intrinsic link to the 
harm alleged. 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION: POTENTIAL POSSIBILITIES AND PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS 
 
A.  Potential Possibilities 
 
A close review of the majority’s position in Ashcroft indicates that 
those opposed to virtual child pornography might be able to pursue an 
alternative method of imposing liability on those creating virtual child 
pornography on the grounds that it leads to child abuse and sexual 
exploitation. In addition to statutory construction problems which 
arguably left the CPPA statute unnecessarily overbroad, the CPPA 
 71. Id. (emphasis added). 
 72. The court does cite the research and findings of Congress when identifying the source of 
the government’s arguments. Id. at 240. 
 73. Id. at 252 (providing that “[t]he evil in question depends upon the actor’s unlawful 
conduct, conduct defined as criminal quite apart from any link to the speech in question”). 
 74. The majority concludes its arguments by summarizing its legal formalist position: 
In sum, U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) covers materials beyond the categories recognized in Ferber 
and Miller, and the reasons the Government offers in support of limiting the freedom of 
speech have no justification in our precedents or in the law of the First Amendment. The 
provision abridges the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech. For 
this reason, it is overbroad and unconstitutional. 
Id. at 256. 
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statute failed to overcome two primary obstacles. First, while the Court 
never properly supported its position, it acknowledged that the state must 
demonstrate a sufficient causal link to show a compelling interest. 
Second, pursuant to the demands of legal formalism, there must be 
precedent (either textual or case law) to support the state action.75 
Essentially the Court was telling law makers that the statute must satisfy 
both the social scientific demands of legal realism and the structural 
demands of legal formalism. 
While this task may appear to be daunting, there appears to be at 
least one alternative that could satisfy both demands: a statutory tort 
claim based on common law principles of negligence for child victims 
that can establish case-specific causation. While this judicial redress 
approach is novel with regard to virtual child pornography, it has an 
interesting history in other areas of the law. The subsequent sections will 
review that history and highlight cases that may provide the legal 
precedent and theory needed to overcome Ashcroft’s legal formalism 
obstacles. Moreover, a review of these cases illustrates why judicial 
redress, rather than prior restraint, may be the most effective way to gain 
legal acceptance of social scientific research in the area of free speech. 
The next section will address civil claims directed at creators of 
violent media messages intended for children, followed by a subsection 
describing attempts within the feminist movement to create a civil cause 
of action for women injured by pornography. 
 
B.  Civil Liability for Violent Media Messages 
 
For over a century, lobbyists and child activists have encouraged 
government to regulate media violence.76 Pursuant to this 
encouragement, media violence is controlled in one of two ways. First, 
Congress or an executive agency may regulate certain kinds of media 
content prior to their dissemination by creating uniform standards and 
guidelines.77 Second, and more important to this discussion, media 
violence can be controlled through judicial redress by allowing 
 75. At the very least, the legal rule must be able to support itself without pursuing 
justification outside of the legal field, for example, social scientific support of causation. See 
Crossroads, supra note 3, at 2. 
 76. Beginning in 1884, state legislators passed laws prohibiting the distribution of magazines 
and newspapers primarily devoted to crime and horror stories. E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr. & Lisa A. 
Hook, The Control of Media-Related Imitative Violence, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 317, 320-21 (1987) 
(citing Law of May 28, 1884, Ch. 380, 1884 N.Y. Laws 464; Law of April 13, 1886, Ch. 177, § 4, 
1886 Iowa Laws 217; Law of March 6, 1885, Ch. 348, 1885 Maine Laws 291). 
 77. This is sometimes referred to as “pre-broadcast” control. Prettyman and Hook assert that 
this control may be more theoretical than practicably given the historic definitional and 
constitutional obstacles inherent in prior restraint. Prettyman & Hook, supra note 76, at 320-21. 
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individuals to bring claims against creators of violence if that violent 
content causes injury.78
Cases involving judicial redress against creators and distributors of 
violent media images fall into three main categories.79 The first and 
largest category includes situations where an individual who has read or 
viewed violent material has followed the example of that material to 
inflict injury on others. The next category includes individuals that 
viewed violent media content and thereafter injured themselves. The 
final category includes cases where the basis of liability is not direct but 
imposed because the producer or creator facilitated an atmosphere or 
environment of violence where the harm was predictable. In each 
category a plaintiff asserts that the creator of the media content has been 
negligent. Therefore, to prevail on their cause of action, plaintiffs must 
establish: (1) the existence of a duty between the defendant and the 
injured person; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) an actual and proximate 
causal relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the injury; and 
(4) actual damages from the injury. 
 
1.  Harm to others 
 
Beginning in the 70s, lower federal and state supreme courts 
addressed liability for actions allegedly instigated by media depictions 
and messages. In Weirum v. RKO General, Inc,80 a jury trial returned a 
$300,000 judgment against a radio station for contributing to the 
wrongful death of a man who was run off the road by teenage drivers 
listening to a disc jockey. The disc jockey had been encouraging listeners 
to locate a radio employee who was driving around the city giving away 
money and prizes.81 The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court verdict finding sufficient evidence of negligence because: (1) the 
radio had a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent others from being 
injured as a result of their conduct; (2) the station created an 
unreasonable risk of harm to the motoring public; and (3) the risk of 
harm was foreseeable by the radio station.82
Despite this favorable precedent, later cases seeking judicial redress 
for media influenced action were less successful. In Olivia N. v. National 
Broadcasting Co.,83 teens that had watched the NBC made for television 
 78. Prettyman & Hook, supra note 76, at 320-21. 
 79. ROBERT M. O’NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY 145-65 (2001). 
 80. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975). 
 81. Id. at 38-39. 
 82. Id. at 39-41. 
 83. 74 Cal. App. 3d 383 (1977), application for stay denied sub nom. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. 
Niemi, 434 U.S. 1354 cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978), aff’d, 126 Cal. App. 3d 488 (1981) cert. 
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movie Born Innocent copied an “artificial rape” scene when they 
sexually assaulted a nine-year old girl.84 In Zamora v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, a fifteen-year old sued the three major television 
networks asserting that his massive exposure to television resulted in his 
“subliminal intoxication” of violence.85 He argued that this intoxication 
and desensitization to violence led him to kill his next-door neighbor.86
Zamora and Olivia N. are indicative of media liability cases decided 
in the late seventies and early eighties. During this time period, judges 
consistently sided with the entertainment industry, basing their holdings 
primarily on two areas of concern.  First, state tort law did not impose an 
actionable special duty on a creator, producer, or distributor of a media 
product. Correspondingly, courts were reluctant to make foreseeability 
judgments that would impose a more general duty allowing for more 
general theories of liability. Second, even if a duty did exist, the courts 
felt that civil damages could possibly unduly burden the free expression 
of those involved in creative works. The courts often resolved the latter 
issue to avoid having to make a determination on the issue of duty. 
An interesting example of this rationale comes from the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts in Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.87 In 
Yakubowicz, teenager Michael Barrett stabbed and killed Martin 
Yakubowicz in a Boston subway car immediately after watching the 
Paramount movie The Warrior.88 Barrett’s attack on Yakubowicz 
imitated the film’s most violent scene.89 What made this scenario 
particularly troubling was the fact that Paramount was keenly aware of 
the movie’s violent potential even before it was released to the general 
public. 
Violence and rioting erupted immediately following the screening of 
the movie in two separate California locations with movie-goers 
damaging substantial amounts of property.90 Apparently in response to 
the violent reaction following the screenings, Paramount took the 
extraordinary and additional precaution of warning the Boston, 
Massachusetts movie theater that violence was a possibility and offered 
to reimburse the theater for extra security guards while the film ran.91 
Paramount even offered to release the theater owner from contractual 
denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982). 
 84. Id. at 386. 
 85. 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979). 
 86. Id. at 200. 
 87. 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass.1989). 
 88. Id. at 1069-70. 
 89. Id. at 1070. 
 90. Id. at 1069. 
 91. Id. 
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liability if he was concerned that showing the film would pose a risk to 
persons or property.92
Despite this knowledge, Paramount ran national advertising and 
promotions of the film focusing on graphic images of “violent carnage 
and bloodshed.”93 Even more disturbing was Paramount’s decision to 
release the film in Boston during the mid-winter school break to 
maximize profits by targeting school age children.94 Nevertheless, the 
Massachusetts high court found Paramount’s undisputed knowledge of 
the movie’s likely potential to incite violence irrelevant. The court 
acknowledged that the producers and movie theater had a “duty of 
reasonable care to members of the public including the [stabbed teen].”95 
But the court concluded that duty was not breached because movies with 
violence had artistic merit and were clearly protected by the First 
Amendment.96 The court’s ruling reflected its concern about the possible 
effect liability would have on the movie industry. 
The trend arguably began to reverse in the early to mid nineties.97 In 
Rice v. The Paladin Enterprises, Inc.,98 the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the publisher of a book which contained step-by-step 
instructions on how to be a hit man and commit murder could be civilly 
liable for the deaths of a mother and her quadriplegic son killed by a 
third person who followed the book’s instructions.99 The court 
specifically rejected the argument that the book was protected under the 
First Amendment after finding the elements of negligence. The court 
concluded: 
 
Indeed, to hold that the First Amendment forbids liability in such 
circumstances as a matter of law would fly in the face of all precedent 
of which we are aware, not only from the courts of appeals but from the 
Supreme Court of the United States itself. Hit Man [the book] is, we are 
convinced, the speech that even Justice Douglas, with his unrivaled 
 92. Id. at 1070. 
 93. Id. at 1069. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1070-71. 
 96. Id. at 1071. 
 97. Arguably the trend could be traced back to the end of 1989. In S & W Seafoods Co. v. 
Jacor Broad. of Atlanta,194 Ga. Ct. App. 233 (1990), a radio talk show host verbally insulted a 
restaurant and its manager on the air and the manager sued for damages. The appellate court 
determined that the First Amendment did not protect the radio personality’s exhortations simply 
because nobody acted upon the exhorted action. The court held that a jury could reasonably conclude 
that the talk show host’s comments could likely lead to illegal action and, therefore, received no First 
Amendment protection. 
 98. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 99. Id. 
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devotion to the First Amendment, counseled without any equivocation 
“should be beyond pale” under a Constitution that reserves to the 
people the ultimate and necessary authority to adjudge some conduct–
and even some speech–fundamentally incompatible with the liberties 
they have secured unto themselves.100
 
A year later in Byers v. Edmondson,101 a Louisiana appellate court 
reversed a trial court’s summary judgment decision that movie producers 
and creators could not be held liable for teenagers copying a murder 
scene from Natural Born Killers. The appellate court disagreed with the 
trial court’s conclusion that it would be impossible for the plaintiff to 
establish enough foreseeability or knowledge to satisfy the requisite level 
of intent.102
 
2.  Harm to oneself 
 
The cases that fall into this category appear to have the strongest link 
between the message and the action. In Shannon v. Walt Disney 
Productions, Inc.,103 an eleven-year old boy watched the Mickey Mouse 
Club, which featured a sound effects segment where an actor showed 
how filling a balloon with air and adding a BB pellet created the sound of 
a car “peeling out.”104 Despite program warnings, the boy attempted to 
reproduce the trick. Unfortunately, the balloon broke; the pellet 
penetrated the boy’s eye and caused him to become partially blind.105 
The boy’s family sued Disney.106
Similarly, in DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Corp.,107 a thirteen-
year old boy watching the Tonight Show then starring Johnny Carson 
observed Carson perform a stunt where a blindfolded Carson dropped 
through a trap door with a hangman’s noose around his neck.108 Despite 
warnings that this was “not something you want to go out and try,” the 
boy tied a noose to a water pipe and attempted to imitate the stunt.109 
Several hours later, with the television still tuned into NBC, the boy’s 
 100. Id. at 267. 
 101. 712 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1998). 
 102. Id. at 691-92. 
 103. 156 Ga. App. 545 (1980), rev’d, 247 Ga. 402 (1981); see also, Note, Children—Defense 
of “Pied Piper” Injury Cases, 30 DEF. LAW J. 473 (1981); Note, Broadcast Negligence and the First 
Amendment: Even Mickey Mouse Has Rights, 33 MERCER L. REV. 423 (1981). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982). 
 108. Id. at 1037-38. 
 109. Id. 
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family found his body hanging from the pipe.110
In both Shannon and DeFilippo, the plaintiffs structured their 
arguments around Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. However, both courts 
limited the Weirum holding to its facts and held that traditional tort law 
did not necessarily provide a sufficient cause of action. Both courts 
provided that this was not a situation where the media creator acted 
unreasonably since the audiences in both cases were warned not to try 
the act at home. Moreover, pursuant to the warnings, it would be 
impossible for the plaintiffs to establish that the defendants had not 
exercised a duty of reasonable care.111 The courts also acknowledged a 
fear that allowing liability for widely disseminated programming like the 
Tonight Show or the Mickey Mouse Club would have a chilling effect on 
popular broadcasting.112
In addition to the television and movie industry, claimants began 
targeting the music industry. In 1984, John McCollum killed himself 
after listening repeatedly to an Ozzy Osbourne song titled Suicide 
Solution.113 The song’s lyrics encouraged listeners to “get the gun and try 
it–shoot, shoot, shoot.”114 McCollum used a gun on himself and his 
parents found him dead with the tape still running.115 After reviewing the 
lyrics that never used the word suicide, the court concluded that the song 
was nothing more than a philosophical discussion of depression.116 The 
court concluded that any reference to suicide was too abstract to be 
directly linked to McCollum’s death.117
In Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,118 a fourteen-year old boy read 
an article entitled Orgasm of Death describing auto-erotic asphyxia 
which combined orgasm with hanging in order to cut off the blood 
supply to the brain.119 Despite warnings in the article, the young teen 
attempted to follow the directions and killed himself.120 Although the 
court found for the defendant media corporation by relying on the 
disclaimer that auto-erotic asphyxia was a dangerous activity, the dissent, 
written by Judge Edith Jones, opened the door for potential liability. It 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1041. 
 112. DeFilippo v. NBC, 446 A.2d 1036, 1037-39 (R.I. 1982); Shannon v. Walt Disney Prods., 
Inc., 156 Ga. App. 545, 548 (1980). 
 113. Ozzy Osbourne, Suicide Solution, on BILZZARD OF OZZ (Jet Records/CBS Records 
1980). 
 114. Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1145-46 (M.D. Ga. 1991). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1151. 
 117. Id. 
 118. 814 F.2d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 119. Id. at 1018. 
 120. Id. at 1019. 
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asserted that states should be able to “fashion a remedy to protect its 
children’s lives when they are endangered by suicidal pornography.”121 
The article in Hustler was not a “bona fide competitor in the marketplace 
of ideas.”122 Rather, Jones asserted that the appeal of the article was non-
cognitive and, therefore, something that should be regulated similarly to 
tobacco, alcohol or drugs. 
 
3.  Environmental or atmospheric liability 
 
Beginning in the seventies, several lawsuits took an indirect 
approach to judicial redress by attempting to hold creators, distributors, 
and producers liable for creating an environment likely to result in 
harm.123 In Bill v. Superior Court, Jocelyn Vargas was shot as she left a 
San Francisco movie theater after watching the movie Boulevard 
Nights.124 Her claim against the producer and distributor was unique in 
that she asserted that it was the act of showing the movie, not its content, 
which caused the harm.125 She argued that the defendants owed a duty of 
care to those within and outside the theater and that this duty was 
breached by their failure to warn those individuals of a likely disorder 
and possible harm.126
Although the court noted the novelty of the assertion, it concluded 
that it could not treat the claim differently based on the two distinct acts 
since the same “chilling effect” was achieved under both theories and, 
therefore, was barred under First Amendment jurisprudence. Despite this 
failure, these novel arguments first presented in Bill arguably inspired 
others and were eventually incorporated into the secondary effects 
analysis that courts now use for justification in sexually oriented business 
zoning laws. While local governments cannot ban sexually explicit 
businesses (some involving the dissemination of media images) based on 
their content, they can regulate the businesses because of the secondary 
effects the businesses could have on the surrounding neighborhood. 
However, it should be noted that the reasoning is similar to Bill in that 
the problem is not with the image itself but with the environment the 
image creates when disseminated.127
 121. Id. at 1025. 
 122. Id. at 1026. 
 123. Id. 
 124. 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 1004 (1982). 
 125. Id. at 1005. 
 126. Id. at 1006. 
 127. The premise that virtual pornography could be regulated pursuant to the secondary effects 
it causes is a real possibility. The argument is that the attraction to virtual child pornography is based 
on sexual and physical stimulus and not any information inherent in the content of the image. Virtual 
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C.  State Civil Rights Claims for Discrimination Caused by Pornography 
 
Independent of the tort claims cited above, another area of legal 
scholarship has attempted to create a cause of action for disseminating 
allegedly harmful material. Media legal activists and scholars in the 
feminist movement as early as the seventies began lobbying for statutes 
and ordinances creating a civil claim against pornographers who 
contribute to the physical harm of a victim of sexual violence.128 The 
concept driving the theory was that pornography subordinates women as 
a class, thereby constituting illegal sex discrimination. In 1983, the 
activists were first successful in passing a variation in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota.129 The Minneapolis ordinance contained four causes of 
action: “coercion into pornography, forcing pornography on a person, 
assault or [physical attack] due to specific pornography, and trafficking 
in pornography.”130 Each cause of action was based on the discriminatory 
impact on women. 
Although the initial motivation of the statute centered on combating 
pornography’s subordination of women as a group, the ordinance was 
passed, at least in part, because of pornography’s demonstrably 
destructive effects on individual women and the harm caused by the 
consumption of pornography. The debate surrounding the proposed 
ordinance was fierce and after a mayoral veto,131 public hearings were 
held with testimony from women who had survived injury caused by 
pornography.132 This testimony was powerful and provided the impetus 
needed to pass the ordinance. 
However, the ordinance’s effective life was short-lived. In American 
Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut,133 the plaintiff and free speech proponents 
asserted that the ordinance violated the First Amendment because it was 
child pornography is more analogous to tobacco, alcohol or drugs in that it is consumed not for 
information but for effect. A prime example is sexually oriented businesses that are not regulated 
pursuant to their content but for the environment effects that inevitably occur. 
 128. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, The Sexual Politics of the First Amendment (1986), in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 175-76 (1987). 
 129. See Penelope Seator, Judicial Indifference to Pornography’s Harm: American 
Booksellers v. Hudnut, 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 297, 299 n.9 (1987) (describing the public 
hearings and debate surrounding the passing of the Minneapolis ordinances including a detailed 
account of testimony of survivors of harm caused by pornography). 
 130. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. 
L. REV. 793, 801-02 (1991) (articulating and discussing the theory and elements of Minneapolis’s 
ordinance). 
 131. See Seator, supra note 129, at 299 n.8 (discussing the mayoral veto of the Minneapolis 
ordinance). 
 132. MIMI H. SILBERT & AYALA M. PINES, PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN 
MAKING VIOLENCE SEXY: FEMINIST VIEWS ON PORNOGRAPHY 113, 115 (Diana E.H. Russell ed., 
1993). 
 133. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
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overbroad and directly conflicted with speech that was constitutionally 
protected.134 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
agreed and held that the ordinance violated pornographers’ First 
Amendment right to free speech. The majority opinion provided that the 
“unhappy” and discriminatory effects of pornography include directed 
aggression, rape, battery, domestic violence, and discrimination. Despite 
this acknowledgment, the majority concluded that “this simply 
demonstrates the power of pornography as speech,” and the need to 
insulate and protect it.135 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit did provide 
activists some hope by openly acknowledging that pornography threatens 
individuals’ rights to physical safety. 
Perhaps encouraged by this silver lining, other municipal 
governments began imposing restrictions on pornography based on civil 
rights principles supported by individual effects. Similar ordinances were 
placed before lawmakers in Los Angeles, California and Cambridge, 
Massachusetts but didn’t pass.136 Bellingham, Washington, by voter 
referendum, passed a law similar to the Minneapolis ordinance which 
was later declared unconstitutional in a suit the city chose not to 
defend.137
The federal government even entered the fray by proposing the 
Federal Pornography Victim’s Compensation Act of 1991. The Act 
would have created a federal cause of action against pornographers for 
victims who could establish that pornography had substantially caused 
harm and that pornography had a reasonably foreseeable connection with 




 134. Id. at 328-33. 
 135. Id. at 329. 
 136. See Morrison Torrey, The Resurrection of the Anti-Pornography Ordinance, 2 TEX. J. 
WOMEN & L. 113, 114 (1993) (discussing the history behind pornography ordinances in Minnesota, 
California, and Massachusetts); Anti-Pornography Law Defeated in Cambridge, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
12, 1985, at A16, col. 6 (ordinance targeting pornography defeated by vote of 13,031 to 9,419). 
 137. Village Books v. City of Bellingham No. 88-1470 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1989); see also 
Margaret A. Baldwin, Pornography and the Traffic in Women: Brief on Behalf of Trudee Able-
Peterson, et al., Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant and Intervener-Defendants, Village Books v. 
City of Bellingham, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 111, 112-13 (1989) (discussing the resolution of the 
Bellingham ordinance and court action). See Morrison Torrey, The Resurrection of the Anti-
Pornography Ordinance, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 113, 114 (1993). 
 138. Pornography Victim’s Compensation Act, S. 983, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1991); 
Stephanie B. Goldberg, 1st Amendment Wrongs: A New Approach To Fighting Pornography Says 
Free Speech Has Nothing To Do With It, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 17, 1993 (Tempo), at 1 
(discussing federal anti-pornography legislation); Charley Roberts, Senators Debate Porn Bill, THE 
LOS ANGELES DAILEY J., Mar. 13, 1992, at 5 (describing the bills’ proponents’ strategy for passage); 
Henry J. Reske, Feminists Back Anti-Porn Bill, A.B.A. J. June, 1992, at 32. 
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V.  A PROPOSITION TO HOLD VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY CREATORS 
LIABLE 
 
Proponents of a state tort claim can learn from the failures and 
limited success of plaintiffs in the violence cases and feminists civil 
rights efforts. Both sets of cases provide valuable insight on how to 
overcome the legal formalism and social scientific bars articulated in 
Ashcroft. 
The subsequent discussion will describe how controlling virtual child 
pornography through judicial redress satisfies the formalism obstacles in 
Ashcroft. Following that description will be a discussion of why virtual 
child pornography is a more suitable topical area for judicial redress than 
the violence or general pornography cases cited above, particularly from 
a legal formalist perspective. Finally, the section will conclude with a 
discussion of the opportunities social science will have pursuant to a 
state-initiated civil cause of action. 
 
A.  Overcoming Formalism and Causation 
 
As noted in Part III, Ashcroft articulated two primary obstacles for 
activists hoping to regulate virtual child pornography: legal formalism 
and social scientific proof of causation. The Court’s legal formalism 
problems in Ashcroft primarily focused on the distinguishable harm 
asserted by the government. First, the Court found that the specific harm 
at issue in Ashcroft was different than Ferber.139 Second, the Court 
reasoned that not only was the harm specifically distinguishable, but the 
kind of harm was not sufficiently related or identifiable to fall under the 
same general state.140
By attempting to regulate creators and producers of virtual child 
pornography through judicial redress rather than by categorical prior 
restraint, drafters of a statutory redress claim automatically avoid the 
specific legal formalist problems identified in Ashcroft. 
To begin with, similarity of harm is irrelevant so long as there is 
actual harm accompanied by a breach of duty and causation. 
Nevertheless, formalistic issues exist that need to be addressed when 
utilizing judicial redress. The subsequent subsections will address those 
issues while explaining why virtual child pornography is a better suited 
topic for judicial redress than violence or general pornography. 
 
 
 139. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 250-51 (2002). 
 140. Id. at 250. 
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B.  Narrowly Tailored Holdings 
 
Since common law theories of tort liability are tailored to deal with 
the facts of a specific case, a state created form of judicial redress based 
on those theories, but limited to acts of molestation and exploitation 
compelled by virtual child pornography images, may provide the 
narrowly drawn holding necessary to pass current constitutional scrutiny. 
For that reason, a statutory tort cause of action is the most likely means 
for holding producers and creators of virtual child pornography 
responsible for their harmful actions. Additionally, a cause of action that 
encourages narrow holdings comports well with the formalistic concerns 
articulated in Ashcroft. 
The wording of the statute would have to be carefully drafted to 
avoid many of the over breadth problems that arose with the CPPA and 
civil rights feminist discrimination cases. Nevertheless, a state cause of 
action based on the common law principle of negligence would have one 
key advantage–precedent. State legislators could point to Weirum, Rice, 
and Byers as authority for premising that, in particular circumstances, 
civil liability claims are not precluded by free speech concerns. 
Moreover, a basis for reliance would satisfy at least one of the legal 
formalist concerns posited in Ashcroft.141
Finally, because a state-articulated negligence tort claim would 
necessarily be dependent upon the facts of a given case, the concern for 
adverse or slippery slope precedent would be of no consequential 
concern. Indicative of this unnecessary concern is the wide spectrum of 
cases with different outcomes and various modes of analysis found in the 
violence cases. The cases are too fact specific to provide any meaningful 
precedent, except possibly the broad notion that liability is a 
possibility.142 Having a cause of action so deeply rooted in the specific 
actions of the involved parties would alleviate many of the legal 
formalism concerns of creating a precedent subject to abuse. 
 
C.  Negligence Tort Claims 
 
Historically, claims involving the elements of negligence have been 
 141. In Ashcroft the formalist assertion was that there was no precedent or textual basis for a 
finding that virtual child pornography should be included as a categorical exception to core speech. 
In this case, a challenged statute creating a cause of action could point to Weirum, Rice, and Byers as 
precedent and satisfy the formalist concern. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241 
(2002). 
 142. Prettyman & Hook, supra note 76, at 344 (Because theories of tort liability are “tailored 
to deal with the facts of a particular case, judicial redress . . . may provide the most narrowly drawn 
[holdings].”). 
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one of the means by which media producers and creators are held 
responsible for risky conduct. While negligence has been recognized as 
an independent cause of action imposing liability for more than a 
hundred years, this was not always the case.143 The use of negligence as a 
basis for liability144 coincided with the technological advances of the 
industrial revolution.145 As means of producing became more complex 
and automated, a worker plaintiff’s old forms of action became 
increasingly inadequate to address the harm that was being caused.146 To 
fairly compensate those injured and deter newly created risky conduct, 
courts began to impose liability based on negligence principles.147 
Similarly, in light of the computer imaging boom, computer enthusiasts 
can now do what was once considered impossible. As such, producers 
and creators of computer images can now engage in new kinds of “risky 
conduct” including the creation of virtual child pornography. 
Pursuant to the theory of negligence, when a person’s conduct 
creates an unreasonable risk of harm, that person has a duty to act with 
the care of a reasonable prudent person under the circumstances.148 Over 
time it was determined that a person’s conduct creates an unreasonable 
risk of harm when the magnitude of the risk is outweighed by the social 
utility of the act.149 In cases dealing with violence and the media, courts 
have constantly struggled with this balance. For example, in Shannon, 
DeFilippo, Olivia N., and Zamora, the various courts had difficulty 
assessing the social utility of the general act that contained the violence 
(for example, television comedy, children’s programming and the movie 
industry). Notwithstanding this difficulty, virtual child pornography is 
much better suited for a balancing test than the violence cases cited 
above. On at least three occasions, the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that child pornography itself was of de minimus social value.150 
 143. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 28, at 160-61 
(5th ed. 1984) (discussing the requisite duty and degree of care imposed to protect against 
unreasonable risk). 
 144. It has been asserted that negligence is merely one way of committing any other tort, and 
in and of itself it had no particular legal significance. See SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS 21-26 (6th ed. 
1924). 
 145. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, § 28 at 161 (“[Negligence’ rise as a cause of 
action] coincided markedly with the Industrial Revolution.”). 
 146. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, § 28 at 161 (“It was greatly encouraged by the 
disintegration of the old forms of action, and the disappearance of the distinction between direct and 
indirect injuries found in trespass and case.”). 
 147. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1963) (providing that the purpose of the 
tort of negligence is to protect individuals from unreasonable risks of harm). 
 148. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (providing that a 
defendant’s conduct must create sufficient risk to plaintiff to justify the imposition of liability). 
 149. Id. 
 150. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-62 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
168 (1944), and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). 
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Additionally, careful statutory construction can narrow the definition of 
virtual child pornography to avoid possible conflicts with mainstream 
motion picture and television producing. Accordingly, if properly 
defined, the social utility of virtual child pornography is so slight, if 
existing at all, that the magnitude of the risk to children will consistently 
outweigh its utility. Thus, opponents of child pornography will likely 
prevail and a duty will be imposed on the media to take due care in 
making films. 
Finally, negligence principles are well suited for this purpose since 
case law has consistently established that courts dealing with negligence 
frequently evaluate public policy factors such as who or what will bear 
the cost of the liability, whether the liability will deter dangerous or risky 
conduct, if there is a need for fiscal compensation by a group of 
individuals likely to be harmed, and whether the action precluded is one 
that society finds morally repugnant.151 In each situation, virtual child 
pornography presents a strong case for allowing the imposition of 
liability. First, the potential victims are children, a discreet and insular 
class that does not have representation in our government and cannot 
protect themselves, unlike consumers of virtual child pornography who 
can vote and have the financial means to influence legislation. Second, 
because most child murderers, molesters, and abusers are not deep 
financial pockets, child victims and their families almost always bear the 
brunt of the costs associated with life long therapy and counseling that 
they typically need. Meanwhile, producers and creators of virtual child 
pornography profit financially by wetting the appetite of these 
perpetrators and by encouraging them to act without any threat of being 
held financially liable.  Moreover, the sexual exploitation of children is 
widely held to be one of the most repugnant and despicable crimes a 
person can commit. 
 
D.  Causation and the Role of Social Science 
 
To receive judicial redress pursuant to a claim based on principles of 
negligence, a plaintiff will have to establish duty, breach, causation, and 
actual harm. Therefore, behavior science must play a significant role in 
finding the intrinsic link between the image content and action to 
establish causation. More importantly, social science will be called upon 
to identify foreseeability, a key element in the determination of duty. As 
has been previously addressed, when a person’s conduct creates an 
 151. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, §4, at 20, 25; id. § 2, at 10; see also, Edith 
L. Pacillo, Note, Getting a Feminist Foot in the Courtroom Door: Media Liability for Personal 
Injury Caused by Pornography, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 123, 141-42 (1994). 
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unreasonable risk of harm, that person has a duty to act with the care of a 
reasonable prudent person under those circumstances.152 The 
determination of whether a person’s conduct was reasonable is 
dependent on the foreseeability of the particular act allegedly causing the 
harm. This question can only be determined through non-legal research. 
Consequently, social science has the critical task of establishing potential 
risk and, therefore, duty. Without social science, the plaintiff would 
never get the opportunity to prove that the case specific facts caused the 
harm the plaintiff incurred. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Under contemporary constitutional rationale, a narrowly drawn cause 
of action based on principles of common law tort liability and dependent 
on case specific circumstances is currently the most likely means of 
holding producers of virtual child pornography responsible for their 
harmful actions. 
The statutory aspect would satisfy many of the legal formalism 
concerns articulated in Ashcroft by providing the historic and precedent-
supported common law elements needed to successfully bring a claim. 
Additionally, because an important aspect of two of those elements, duty 
and causation, necessarily requires determination of the foreseeability 
and causation of the conduct influencing injury, social science would 
have a substantial role in helping a prospective plaintiff successfully 
litigate a claim. Furthermore, because one of those elements is causation, 
the general causation concern articulated in Ashcroft would be alleviated 
since every case is based on its particular facts, and would have to 
establish the requisite relationship between consumption and that specific 
harm. Finally, by referring to the Supreme Court’s determination that 
child pornography images in general are of de minimus social value, a 
careful drafter of legislation defining virtual pornography could avoid 
potential arguments that judicial redress could result in an unnecessary 
“chilling effect” precedent. 
In conclusion, whether or not one agrees with the holding of 
Ashcroft, one thing is certain: the Ashcroft decision will result in an 
increase of images depicting children being sexually exploited. 
Additionally, more people will have access to virtual child pornography. 
As such, the contrary and largely behavioral scientific assertions that 
virtual child pornography results in increased child abuse and sexual 
exploitation will be tested. In a way, social science will get what it has 
 152. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101 (providing that a defendant’s conduct must create sufficient 
risk to a plaintiff to justify the imposition of liability). 
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seemingly wanted–an opportunity to prove itself. The theoretical and 
practical models of interdisciplinary research asserting that virtual child 
pornography causes harm to children will either be proven or displaced. 
But at what price? 
If social science is right, and the United States Supreme Court is 
wrong, this great societal experiment will not be without casualties. 
Children, the most vulnerable group in society, with the most to lose, and 
with no direct political voice, will effectually become the lab rats. 
Unfortunately, without judicial redress remedies, conducting this societal 
test would be paramount to conducting a free laboratory test at the forced 
physical, emotional, and psychological expense of our children – 
society’s greatest natural resource. What will happen if Justice 
Kennedy’s words are misguided and “the evil in question” does depend 
on a relationship between action and speech? What if virtual child 
pornography is intrinsically linked to the sexual exploitation of children? 
Given the current framework, the only answer for any government that 
cares even minimally for children is judicial redress. 
